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ON THE SICKNESS OF MODERN REASON 
OR, WHAT IF...? 
Murray Code 
    
 
  `We have met the enemy, and he is us.'  Walt Kelly      
 
ABSTRACT: Finding the methods and results of the allegedly rational thought of modern 
naturalists  seriously deficient, Vine Deloria Jr., native Indian political activist turned naturalistic 
thinker, suggests that indigenous thinkers are in this respect more sensible than modern, 
scientistic naturalists. He traces their good sense to a consistent empiricism which strives to take 
into account all aspects of their concrete experiencing. Lacking however the support of a vitalistic 
metaphysics that can synthesize their best insights, their modes of thought tend to be dismissed 
as superstitious and irrational. Yet it is nonetheless possible to defend their core belief, that they 
dwell in a moral universe. To see this one requires a  means to overcome the deadening effects 
of the abstract language of modern reason which presupposes the adequacy of the metaphysics 
of mechanistic materialism. This can be done starting with Samuel Butler's incomplete 
Lamarckian account of the evolution of this living cosmos, an account that can be supplemented 
by fashioning a vitalistic metaphysics based on the most salient characteristics of a living self using 
certain insights of A. N. Whitehead, Gilles Deleuze, S. T. Coleridge, among others.  
KEYWORDS: Deloria; Whitehead; Deleuze; Coleridge; scientistic naturalism; native Indian 
cosmology; moral or ethical faculties, systematic reason; power; myth. 
                                                                                                 
 
1. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
To ask this famous question in 2017 under the threat of an imminent global catastrophe 
is to invite a host of interlocking questions, not the least of which is whether rescue is 
possible in the short time that we seem to have available. This is apart from the worry 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 78 
whether a sufficiently determined collective will could be mustered to effect the 
necessary changes in thinking that are unavoidable.  Then again, the impending 
environmental crisis, which is generally referred to as anthropogenic `climate change,' 
may be but one of many symptoms of a dying civilization that is passing through the last 
stages of its finite time on Earth.   
But the real irony may be that the impending disaster is the price for a deceptive 
success, for the latter can be associated with an especially efficacious but ultimately toxic 
form of reasoning which is inherently prone to use coercive and violent methods.1 For it 
is a kind of reasoning that plays down the need to frequently stop and think about what 
kind of thinking and living is conducive to a healthy civilization. That is to say, the 
civilization of the West has manifestly  entrenched a collective mentality that has 
engendered economic and political institutions that promote a kind of mindlessness 
which has paved the way for global ecocide.2  
What a great irony it would be, then, if the self-styled `civilized' representatives of 
European civilization, who were allegedly bent on civilizing the ` savage'' peoples of other 
lands, had missed a golden opportunity. They might have learned from indigenous 
peoples that  all human beings dwell in a moral universe and so bear a certain 
responsibility for the well-being of Nature and all her creatures. They might even have 
learned something about the getting of wisdom from such thinkers as the Oglala Sioux 
medicine man Black Elk who Vine Deloria Jr. cites thus:   
After finishing his story, Black Elk paused, was silent for a time, and said: “This 
they tell you, and whether it happened or not, I do not know; but if you think about 
it, you can see that it is true.”3  
Deloria herewith prompts an intriguing question: What if the early conquerors of 
America had been really enlightened and inclined to ponder the question of the meaning 
of good thinking and good living. They might have, for one thing, been less inclined to 
associate good reasoning with the accidental trait of `whiteness.' They might even have 
developed a capacity to look more critically at their beliefs and actions and seen that 
their imperialistic behaviour was the sign of an unbalanced and hypocritical culture. In 
                                                          
1. I elaborate on this theme in my article “Reason and Violence” in the Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and 
Conflict, Volume 3 (New York: Academic Press, 1999).  
2.  See, Arran Gare, Nihilism Inc.: Environmental Destruction and the Metaphysics of Sustainability (Como, NSW: 
Eco-Logical Press, 1996) for an extensive philosophical-historical account of how Western European 
civilization developed a nihilistic collective mentality that has led to the takeover of this culture by a 
predatory form of capitalism.  
3. See the chapter entitled “If You Think About It, You Will See That It Is True,” in Vine Deloria Jr., Spirit 
and Reason: The Vine Deloria Jr. Reader (Colorado Fulcrum Publishing, 1999, hereafter referred to as SR), p. 
44.  
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the case of the invaders of north America, they might as a consequence have eschewed 
such presumptuous myths as "manifest destiny" and "American exceptionalism." For 
there can now be no question that such myths have conveniently covered over a moral 
vacuity that is sustained by an essentially dishonest collective mentality---one whose bad 
sense was first made manifest in the genocidal actions of  the early colonists to remove 
indigenous peoples from the land they coveted.4  
But Deloria indicates that it is not too late to attend more closely to the thinking of 
indigenous peoples and in particular to the kind of thinking illustrated by Black Elk who 
perhaps illustrates the best sort of thinking wherein it might be possible to `see' things 
that deserve the name of `truth.'  
Whether or not this is so, Deloria does succeed in drawing out the questionable  
rationality of the modern conception of good sense. He is especially intent on showing 
that to get anywhere when trying to make sense of the world it is first necessary to 
venture into that vast and murky area of philosophical inquiry called metaphysics. The 
trouble is that few present-day self-styled naturalists engage in such risky venturing since 
they are evidently afraid of getting lost---which is quite possible since here there are no 
clearly marked paths to follow.5 That metaphysics is nonetheless of primary importance 
when attempting to frame a just and reasonable  account of some fundamental aspect 
of the naturing of Nature is however not that hard to understand---that is, once one 
acknowledges the great range of problems and questions that need to be addressed when 
                                                          
4. See, e.g., Thomas King, The Inconvenient Indian: A Curious Account of Native People in North America (Anchor 
Canada, 2013). King traces the history of the duplicitous treatment of native Indians by the early (and later) 
colonists of America whose treaty-making was mainly a smoke-screen covering over the intention to seize 
ever more land. For an exhaustive discussion of how systematically the native peoples of America 
have been robbed of their lands by their supposedly civilized saviours, see, e.g., Geoffrey Yorke, 
The Dispossessed (London: Vintage U.K., 1990) and Thomas R. Berger, The Long and Terrible Shadow: 
White Values, Native Rights in the Americas (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press). Berger sums up the 
matter thus: `The colonies of Europeans established throughout North and South America---and 
the nation-states that succeeded them---adopted legal regimes....designed to ensure that  Indian 
land passed into European ownership, whether that of individuals or the state.' (p. 109) 
5. See Vine Deloria, Jr., The Metaphysics of Modern Existence (New York: Harper & Row, 1979, hereafter 
referred to as MME). Deloria's principal claim is that `the view of the world which formerly dominated 
Western peoples and which currently dominates Western science is being transformed into an ancient and 
all-encompassing attitude toward life, best characterized by the American Indian cultures and traditions' (p. 
ix). Thus in respect to his use of the general term `indigenous,' Deloria's study is important just because he 
takes pains to articulate a very basic challenge to non-native naturalists: to show why the attitudes of mind 
that inform the reasonings of native peoples are not more rational, as Deloria intimates, than the supposedly 
paradigmatically rational systematic reasonings of the moderns.   
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attempting to make sense of `good sense,' not to mention the idea of Nature itself.6  
As Deloria indicates in a number of ways, there are many reasons for suspecting that 
it is fear of both complexity and uncertainty that accounts for a widespread aversion to 
metaphysics in modern philosophy. It is therefore no mere quibble to note that those 
who are prone to dismiss indigenous thinking as irrational and superstitious are just as 
likely to endorse a kind of mathematical mysticism. A strong Galilean faith in the 
unlimited powers of mathematical methods of reasoning bespeaks a closed sectarian cast 
of mind which effectively grants magical powers to, for instance, celebrated 
mathematical physicists (such as Stephen Hawking who envisages a scientific `theory of 
everything.') It is as though it were beyond doubt that a sufficiently detailed examination 
of a skeleton is capable of revealing all the vital characteristics of the living organism that 
once covered it.  
It would therefore be well for me to stress that I am not denying that some essays in 
systematic reasoning are indeed capable of illuminating the signs of orderliness that 
manifest themselves in the naturing of Nature. I am rather questioning the very sanity 
of a collective mentality that has adopted the presumption that science is capable of 
mapping a straight and well-paved high road to wisdom. Although there can be no 
doubt that some forms of systematic reasoning can produce valuable knowledge, it is 
always in order to ask: of what exactly? Perhaps only the fact that the orderliness in 
Nature is amenable to mathematical methods of investigation. Such methods have 
without doubt proven themselves effective in exposing, for instance, the periodic or 
rhythmical patterns that infuse the spatio-temporal forms of organization that come and 
go in this restless world.  
While this is no small achievement, it cannot justify a faith in the unlimited powers 
of mathematical symbolisms to reveal ultimate truths. The efficaciousness of these 
symbolisms suggests that what stands at the heart of this is the question of the role of 
symbolizing in `good thinking'; that is, the sort of thinking that appears to get some 
things `right.' This eventuality suggests a happy confluence of natural powers that can 
close, at least temporarily, the gaps that separate inquiring human minds from the 
worlding of the world.  
The point is that what at first appears to be an insoluble mystery may not be so 
much an embarrassment for the orthodox modern naturalist as the best of reasons for 
venturing into the vast and open domain of metaphysics. Never mind that one may 
sooner or latter find oneself at a loss when seeking the next direction to move in. Perhaps 
                                                          
6. I have begun to explore aspects of the slippery problem of how sense is made in the first place in  my 
Process, Reality, and the Power of Symbols: Thinking with A. N. Whitehead (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, 
hereafter referred to as PRPS).  
 MURRAY CODE 81 
only a neurotic fear of uncertainty stands in the way of modern thinkers from 
recognizing that some native thinkers like Black Elk need to be taken very seriously.  
But be that as it may, it is an ever-burning question of philosophy: how the human 
organism might best conceive its place in the ongoing naturing of Nature. Or as Rising 
Sun might more poignantly ask: how a truly reasonable and responsible person might 
find `the proper moral and ethical road upon which human beings should walk'?7  
2. ON BEGINNING TO THINK HARD ABOUT THINKING 
Once one acknowledges that the usually suppressed possibility that natural philosophy 
involves moral/ethical questions that cannot be ignored without contributing to an 
endemic bad sense, it becomes evident that a perhaps unbridgeable chasm separates 
native cosmologists from their modern counterparts. The former do not doubt that they 
dwell in a living cosmos which is part of a moral universe. And the latter have great 
difficulty even conceiving this as a reasonable possibility.  
So it is first worth pausing to note that Deloria's doubts about the sanity of the 
proponents of modern reason are far from unique. Consider, for instance, the writings 
of Friedrich Nietzsche whose critique of modern reason stems from a profound concern 
for the long-term health of the civilization of the West. Charging his contemporaries 
with dishonesty and self-deception, Nietzsche suggests that they are prone to embrace 
narrow perspectives in their quest for ever more exact knowledge; knowledge that is 
frequently merely superfluous if not harmful. He thus hints at a toxicity in modern 
reason which is contagious; indeed, he holds that some very prestigious educational 
institutions are engaged in the teaching of a kind of stupidity.  
The evils that accompany this kind of toxicity are perhaps most evident in the steady 
retreat of the humanities from the halls of academe at a time when their assistance is 
most urgently needed. That is, at a time when a radical rethinking of the human capacity 
for reason is critical. Yet the leading intellectual and political thinkers in the culture of 
the West appear to have turned over to unimaginative bureaucrats the vital task of 
deciding what is the best sort of education for the young. 
Hence when Nietzsche accuses the moderns of thinking with a bad conscience, he 
underscores in effect the importance of asking whether or not indigenous thinkers are 
victims of a culture so mired in bad sense that it has covered over its short-comings with 
a steady stream of propaganda touting the virtues of techno-scientific `progress.' Yet the 
evidence of steadily deteriorating ecologies and devastated environments ought to 
                                                          
7. SR, p. 43. 
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provide reason enough to wonder whether this culture's Achilles Heel lies in its 
conception of ` progress.' I am referring in particular to the  widespread tendency to look 
down on native peoples who insist on retaining their culturally entrenched, putatively 
irrational attitudes towards all of Nature and her creatures, living and non-living.   
For it is just here, as Deloria makes clear, that the question of the presence of Spirit 
in the worlding of the world becomes pertinent. This presence is recognized by 
indigenous thinkers and strenuously denied by self-consciously rational moderns, which 
suggests the existence of an immense chasm separating these two modes of thought. The 
matter thus underscores the unavoidability of the question of how to think about the 
naturalist's task: of how one might fit the most salient characteristics of experiencing into 
a plausible and adequate picture of the cosmos. For without such a picture how could a 
thinking person begin to adjudicate conflicting pronouncements about what is actually 
going on in the world?  
It is thus worth stressing that one of the largest obstacles in trying to achieve a 
balanced conception of good reasoning is what to make of the `softer' or affective side 
of thinking. That is, the non-rigorous side which is especially sensitive to, for instance, 
the cognitive significance of certain striking images and the emotions that accompany 
them. Or in other words, that side of experiencing which the indigenous thinker is least 
likely to ignore.   
So it is also worth noting that Nietzsche suggests that thinking tout court is ultimately 
rooted in the realm of the imaginal. What else but an affectively guided mode of thought, 
if that is the case,  could resolve the tensions that arise in the continual interplay of 
images, ideas, feelings, and emotions that accompanies all efforts to think? It is hardly 
self-evident that the affective or emotional undercurrents of thought are irrelevant to the 
quest for understanding.  
To face the matter of good reasoning squarely, in other words, one needs to start 
with an open mind, especially in regards to the question of what kind of metaphysics is 
needed. It also calls for a closer look at how the world is actually encountered in the first 
place by warm-blooded experiencing animals. Here we perhaps arrive at the main 
motivation for Deloria's foray into metaphysics---which is not in fact his primary field of 
concern (which is mainly focused on the problems native peoples face in trying to protect 
their cultures). He is especially concerned by the lack of communication between Indians 
and non-Indians; indeed, he notes that these two companies `are speaking about two 
entirely different perceptions of the world.'8  
By thus identifying perception as holding the key to finding a truly sensible way of 
                                                          
8. MME, p. vii. 
 MURRAY CODE 83 
thinking and living in this world, Deloria thus underscores the importance of the 
problem that the example of Black Elk point to and which suggests that the moderns 
have failed to think deeply enough about the meaning of  `good seeing,' not to mention 
`reality,' and `truth.' Indeed, Nietzsche indicates that the moderns have so badly 
miscontrued the idea of `good seeing' that they are in no position to decide one way or 
another whether human  experiencing generally bears witness to spiritual powers in 
Nature, let alone whether or not we dwell in a moral universe.   
3. ON THINKING ABOUT EXPERIENCE 
The above remarks are meant only to provide an indication of the range of questions 
that need to be addressed when comparing indigenous and modern conceptions of good 
reasoning. Deloria can be read as hinting that certain indigenous thinkers are privy to a 
kind of wisdom that at times enable acts of ‘seeing’ that belong to the order of visions. It 
may be, in other words, that the example of Black Elk attests to an unusual intuitive 
facility in thinking with images---one that suggests that some indigenous thinkers are 
indeed in possession of a certain wisdom.   
But does this last notion not suggest a picture of the universe which is for the most 
part wrapped in an impenetrable mystery? It is not incidental that native cosmologists 
indicate as much when they presume that experiencing illustrates a general principle of 
relativity. Maintaining that such a principle is in fact the mainstay in the religious 
practices of North-American Indians, Deloria notes that they use the phrase “All my 
relatives” as an opening invocation and closing benediction for their ceremonies.9 That 
this is no minor consideration is evident, ironically enough, from some of the more 
philosophically significant discoveries of modern physics.  
Deloria himself notes that advances in quantum physics indicate that every knower 
is somehow intimately bound up what he/she knows. Although something of a paradox 
for the early modern naturalist, this anti-Cartesian result points towards the impossibility 
of clearly and distinctly separating observers from what they claim to see.  
Consistent with the native cosmologist's principle of relativity is another, perhaps 
even more significant result of quantum physics that concerns the intriguing possibility 
that under certain conditions there may be perceptions that bear witness to 
instantaneous communications between widely separated forms of sensibility. Indeed, 
                                                          
9. SR, p. 52. He also notes that from the indigenous point of view, `Einstein's thesis ...is hardly revolutionary 
and probably just a simple corrective to the centuries of belief that human beings could know the innermost 
workings of the larger cosmos by examining phenomena on one tiny planet on the edge of a galaxy' (SR, p. 
32).  
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the entire universe may be comprised of inter-woven communicative systems in which 
one part `knows' instantaneously what is going on in distant parts. This phenomenon 
(which is often referred to in quantum physics by the name of `non-locality') may even 
be implicated in those unorthodox perceptions that go under the name of ESP and 
which Carl Jung termed `synchronous.' It is not insignificant anyway that he links the 
phenomenon of `synchronicity' to the possibility of instantaneous communications of 
meanings---which his colleague Wolfgang Pauli associated with certain insights of the 
premodern alchemists.  
This ever-expanding problematic suggests at any rate that modern physicists who 
insist on the indispensability of the `classical' language of pre-quantum physics are 
merely expressing a quasi-religious faith in the adequacy of `classical' concepts which 
reflect reflect a deep faith in the adequacy of the metaphysics of materialism which 
informs the `classical' achievements of Newton, et al. Jung, on the other hand, is 
suggesting that this metaphysics is incapable of doing justice to the fundamental notion 
of causality. In other words, the problem of how to interpret the results of quantum 
experiments indicates that Deloria is on the right track in stressing the importance of 
metaphysics in doing natural philosophy.   
At issue, in short, is the question of what sort of metaphysically infused language is 
most suitable to express the cosmic activity of cosmogenesis (which is a term I will come 
back to). That is to say, what is chiefly at issue is how to speak about what is going on in 
both the near and far regions of the naturing of Nature. One of the most important 
lessons to be learned from science, in other words, is  that it makes all the difference 
what sort of language you adopt to express your experimental results. Quantum physics 
points up the importance of first becoming clear, or at least clearer, about what is going 
on in the fundamental business of perception. It is highly significant that Pauli insists on 
finding a new way to talk about the connections between observers and observed; he 
urges replacing the idea of an `external reality' with that of a `reality of symbols.'10 
Not only has the failure to deal with this crucial consideration led to a serious 
misconstrual of ` good seeing' in modern thought. It has resulted in an unjust denigration 
of the sort of `seeing' that Black Elk seems to illustrate. This point bears directly on the 
                                                          
10. For an excellent introduction to the idea of a quantum reality, see Mae-Wan Ho, The Rainbow and the 
Worm: The Physics of Organisms (World Scientific Publishing Co., 3rd edn., 2008). Ho states, for instance, that 
`the quantum age entails a shift to a truly organic way of living and perceiving the world....that will 
reconnect Western science to the deeply ecological and holistic knowledge systems of all indigenous cultures' 
(p. 271). In Ho's view, a `quantum world' will emerge which is `radically interconnected, 
interdependent...where every entity, from elementary particle to galaxy, evolves like an organism, entangled 
with all there is in nature.'  
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nature of the large gap that separates indigenous cosmologist from those modern 
cosmologists who propagate, for instance, the Big Bang theory of the  origin of the 
cosmos---which is a theory that appears to be  about as far from the deliverances of 
ordinary or concrete experiencing as one can get.  
Deloria thus understandably emphasizes the fact that `the Indian confronts the 
reality of the experience, and while he or she may not make immediate sense of it, it is 
not rejected as an invalid experience'---even if it happens not to conform to established 
`mental considerations and assumptions regarding the universe.' Again, he notes that:  
Indians believed that everything that humans experience has value and instructs 
us in some aspect of life. The fundamental premise is that we cannot 
“misexperience” anything; we can only misinterpret what we experience.11  
In sum, indigenous thinkers may be the least likely of all types of naturalistic thinkers to 
commit what Whitehead calls the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.12 By the same 
token, it is not surprising that the interpretations of the moderns of scientifically 
controlled experiencings become increasingly fanciful as they become less and less 
dependent on accessible forms of imagery; that is, on that aspect of thinking that 
indigenous peoples favour when they indicate that what is most needed in cosmology is 
a synthetic rather than an analytic approach to the understanding of natural events.   
Such considerations are at least in accord with the fact that a desire for an 
explanation attests to a special interest in a `something' that has captured the attention 
of a sentient, inquisitive form of sensibility---that is, the phenomena that appear to be 
both interesting and important. It is thus far from incidental that Deloria describes the 
`cornerstone' of explanation for primitive peoples in terms of `the presence of energy 
and power [which] is the starting point of their understanding and analyses of the 
natural world.'13 The intensity of the emotions that accompany such heightened 
moments of experiencing is for them especially significant since this intensity may well 
be a sign of the presence of nonmaterial or spiritual powers in Nature. 
Deloria thus sketches a conception of indigenous thinking that both starts with and 
keeps open the possibility that the worlding of the world is chiefly guided by more or less 
sensitive communications involving more or less perspicacious souls who enjoy different 
forms of sensibility. He notes that `the old Indians...saw and experienced personality in 
every aspect of the universe,' which is a view that can only be properly criticized from a 
                                                          
11. SR, pp. 45-46.  
12. Or as Nietzsche puts a similar point, the tendency to put first what ought to come last.   
13. Deloria notes especially that `Western thinkers continually misinterpret the recognition of power by 
primitive people as if it were a conclusion they had reached rather than a beginning they were making ' 
(MME, 153).  
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perspective `large' enough to take in the whole universe and all its sense-making 
creatures. It is therefore one of strengths of the indigenous thinker to hold that every 
living inhabitant of this cosmos has its own peculiar ways of experiencing the world. And 
that the character of this experiencing is intimately bound up with the personality of the 
experiencer, which is a consideration that is directly relevant to the question of the kind 
and quality of the various kinds of spiritual powers involved in a process of world-making 
that is going on always and everywhere.   
So it is worth reiterating that what is mainly at issue here is whether or not human 
beings dwell in a living cosmos---where the adjective presents a major challenge to 
would-be naturalists.   Indeed, it makes no sense for a living human being to say that 
he/she is both infused with a certain degree of `quickness' and is also an inhabitant of 
an essentially dead universe. But without doubt it is not easy to elucidate the notion of 
`quickness'---although there is no reason why anyone who is conscious of being alive 
should think that the notion makes no sense. So nothing stands in the way of a native 
person claiming that he/she is but one vital element of a cosmic vitality that is replete 
with many different kinds of more or less `quickened' personalities whose very existence 
bespeaks a world replete with an immense variety of inter-connected, more or less vital 
souls.     
4. SO WHAT MIGHT A GOOD NATURALISTIC EXPLANATION LOOK 
LIKE? 
The foregoing remarks point towards the real difficulty that Deloria is addressing, which 
is how to conceive a vitalistic metaphysics informed by a general principle of relativity, 
one that is sympathetic to the indigenous view that we, the living, dwell in a moral 
universe. So it is important to note that Deloria is not suggesting that indigenous 
cosmologists do not have a critical attitude towards their fondest beliefs. Such thinkers 
are always prepared to jettison assumptions and presuppositions that cannot be justified 
in terms of the most salient aspects of concrete experiencing. Deloria is moreover not 
maintaining that the lack of communication between the Eurocentric colonists and 
native Indian thinkers could have been avoided if only both sides had found a way to 
reconcile their different attitudes towards concrete experiencing. Something far more 
important is at stake; something that bears directly on the question not only of the 
adequacy but also the sanity of the sort of reasoning that the moderns promote as 
`normal.' 
Deloria is particularly critical of those moderns who encourage the hubristic 
tendency to associate the reasonings of indigenous peoples with primitive stages in the 
evolution of consciousness; that is, with ways of thinking that are `primitive' in the sense 
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of being essentially rooted in unthinking reactions to stimuli. This shoe is a better fit for 
the modern foot, he intimates, which is not to say he is claiming that indigenous peoples 
always walk upright along straight paths. 
But all that seems clear at this point is that appeals to common sense are as useless 
as appeals to the objectivity of science's putatively rational and exact pronouncements. 
At the heart of the whole issue is the puzzle that keeps reappearing---how might one best 
frame a rational account of the naturing of Nature---which is itself an extremely vague 
notion that  calls for a kind of reasoning that probably can only hope to get some things 
more or less right some of the time.  
Apropos this tacit claim for the impossibility of exactly defining the idea of 
rationality, it is thus worth noting that Gilles Deleuze, one of Nietzsche's most gifted 
admirers, argues in some detail that common sense cannot supply sufficient grounds for 
elucidating the meaning of good sense.14  He at the same time expands upon the failure 
of modern reason to come to terms with the fact that serious inquiry tends frequently to 
be traduced by what he calls the three `misadventures of thought'---madness, 
malevolence, and stupidity. One might therefore be tempted to think that the very idea 
of a communally endorsed good sense is a red herring. However, one can also cite as a 
counter-example the common practice of concert goers who spontaneously join in an 
enthusiastic applause at the end of a performance---thus signifying a common, more or 
less silent but unanimous value-judgment. Or perhaps better, an instance of more or less 
coherent instantaneity (synchronicity) in the valuing that experiencing inevitably 
involves. The plain truth is that most people often act spontaneously as though they had 
no doubt that all living beings dwell in a common world---as is witnessed by those 
dramatically charged moments when accidents leave no time for debate as to what is 
`real' or not.  
It is also a strong possibility that this world includes a great variety of sensibilities 
whose different kinds of awarenesses bespeak many different kinds of reality. This 
observation should come as no surprise to pet-lovers who might even be disposed to use 
the word wisdom in some cases of animal behaviour. Although postmodern thinkers 
may have persuasively argued that the meanings of `real' or `true' or `good' are always 
contestable, this need be regarded as a hurdle to would-be rational thinkers only by 
those who insist that two different perceivers should `see' exactly the same `reality' at 
any given moment. The real difficulties in understanding perception, in other words, 
are also illustrated by Black Elk whose pause for contemplation suggests an unconscious 
                                                          
14. I discuss some of  Deleuze's important contributions to the problem of the meaning of good sense in 
Chapter 7 of my PRPS.  
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enlistment of hidden powers that may at times lead to ` true' or ` real' visions. But whether 
or not such a conjecture can be justified, it is clear that different perceivers `see' different 
`realities' according to how well they have learned to `see.' For there is no logical 
difficulty involved in acknowledging that when some indigenous perceivers claim to be 
inspired by spiritual forces as well as moved by material ones, they may simply be stating 
a fact about their own peculiar history of learning how to `see.'  
That modern thinkers are especially handicapped in respect to the problem of 
learning is perhaps the most important lesson to be  learned from indigenous thinkers. 
In other words, it is necessary to face up to the possibility that `good learning' alludes 
also to the  immaterial side of perception. The point bears directly on the possibility of 
a debilitating sickness of reason that both Nietzsche and Deleuze allude to. The latter 
traces the etiology of this disease to a `dogmatic image of thought' which constricts the 
inherent freedom of thought. This image can thus be associated with the widespread 
tendency to give precedence to the conceptual over the imaginal. As Deleuze puts the 
point, serious thinking is constrained to move only within the boundaries of a 
conceptually circumscribed `world of representation.' 
It is thus especially noteworthy that Deleuze concludes his exhaustive critique of 
modern reason with the declaration that `all is contemplation.' Not only does he hereby 
open up thought to the possibility of intuitive powers, he also indicates that Black Elk's 
pause for contemplation may bear witness to an especially well-cultivated imagination-
--one that has perhaps access to salient features of the experiencings of long-dead 
ancestors. 
In other words, whether or not Black Elk has really seen a `truth' may depend to a 
large extent on what he learned from his teachers and their ancestors about `good 
seeing.' Deleuze in fact refers to the long apprenticeship that is required for educing 
properly all the powers deployed by all the faculties that are involved in an act of 
perception. If these powers, as he intimates, are a gift from Nature that are given only 
in a state of latency, everything must depend on how they are subsequently educed.  
When viewed from this Deleuzian perspective, then, it should not be at all surprising 
if a great many supposedly well-educated people never learn how to properly use all 
their natural  powers---especially if their learning has been controlled by educators who 
are wedded to narrow perspectives that deny the existence of such powers.  
 At this point, we seem to have come full circle back to the heart of the problem of 
`good seeing'---for the thinking of Black Elk may be peculiar only in the sense that he 
learned to become an especially astute `listener' to faint resonances or dissonances in his 
visceral feelings that bespeak the existence of immaterial natural powers. In which case, 
what else but his emotions could teach him that he was an especially astute imaginative-
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intuitive interpreter of the plethora of signs and signals that would seem to be the `stuff' 
of  acts of contemplation? 
Indeed, when Deleuze's ontology of event-encounters leads him to declare that `all 
is contemplation.' he evokes the image of thinking as a complex and uncertain mingling 
and meeting of `inner' feelings and `outer' worldly exigencies. Since the latter allude to 
more or less meaningful relationships that arise in the cosmic process of meaning-
making, Deleuze's line of thought elicits a restless drama in which it is not always easy 
to tell the spectators apart from the participants. He in fact enlists the trope of 
`complicity' to express the formation of connections that link acts of minding to certain 
events belonging to the naturing of Nature. He thereby opens wide the door to 
nonmaterial as well as materially infused influences; specifically to imaginative powers 
whose exercise may be like that of good artists who evidence a special sensitivity to slight 
differences in the quality of the fleeting emotional intensities that accompany their 
ceative efforts.   
In any case, once one acknowledges the emotional side of experiencing one must at 
the very least jettison all those fond hopes of systematic reasoners who yearn for a final 
and complete understanding of the universe. This renunciation is in fact not too hard to 
make if one regards emotions as  impure mixtures, or perhaps better amalgams, of 
feelings and concepts. The intensity of any emotion aroused in experiencing can thus be 
interpreted as pointing towards particularly energetic creative-critical interactions 
between embodied feelings and ephemeral ideas.15  
So it is well worth noting that this is a description to which many poets might 
subscribe, and especially those who regularly struggle with the problem of finding just 
the right word to express what cannot be said in propositional language. Non-
representational painters or composers of contemporary music also illustrate the 
possibility that a kind of artful reasoning is being exercised, one that involves a rapid to 
and fro movement between the conceptual and the affective sides of thinking. This 
peculiar dynamic, which elicits  the notion of a living reason, manifestly involves 
affectively guided judgments that do not presuppose a clearly envisaged goal. Indeed, 
the `art object' that many artists set out to create often only emerges as a pleasant 
surprise towards the end of their creative efforts, which are never really done.  They thus 
indicate that only certain visceral feelings of `rightness' or `satisfaction' could provide a 
warrant for the claim that they have made  something of value.  
                                                          
15. Abundant illustrations are afforded by theatrical dramas that revolve around dynamic interactions 
between concepts and feelings. Such as Shakespeare's tragedy Othello in which a failure to stop and think 
leads Othello to become an uncritical pawn of the cunning Iago who drops a series of corrosive hints as to 
Desdemona's infidelities.  
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In other words, Black Elk's pause for contemplation is not at all strange if one 
interprets it as akin to the enlistment of a natural artful or living reason that evidently 
takes time to find out whether or not it is ` seeing' truth. For it is not impossible that Black 
Elk was able to cultivate such a reason during an earlier period of education in which 
his teachers showed him how to dynamically balance the contrasting poles of feelings 
and concepts.  
5. ON BEGINNING TO TELL NATURALISTIC TALES 
Briefly then, it is possible that an artful reasoner is someone who is capable of  `seeing' 
what only a wise soul could have suspected was worth looking for in the first place. This 
allusion to the intuitive wisdom intrinsic to certain forms of indigenous minding indicates 
at any rate that the idea that consciousness can be explained scientifically is a dangerous 
delusion. That is, it is capable of undermining serious efforts to understand the `inner' 
processes that yield the actual world of concrete experiencing. It therefore places the 
refusal of indigenous thinkers to sharply divide the psychical from the physical side of 
experiencing in an especially good light.   
In other words, in so far as the mindings of indigenous thinkers refer to a multifarious 
activity that is part and parcel of the worlding of the world, and inasmuch as this activity 
can be depicted as a dynamic inter-action of many kinds of personalities, the notion of 
wisdom may actually be indispensable to any adequate understanding of the worlding 
of the world. Put another way, it shows that the common or garden use of the trope of 
`seeing' for understanding makes very good sense. The trouble is that no notion seems 
more familiar or more obscure than that of understanding itself. Unless it is the self who 
is attempting to understand. 
The sort of `seeing' that informs Black Elk's pronouncement of  certain truths may 
refer to a long history of meaning-making by personalities who employed symbol-
making powers to preserve in sound-symbols evocations of significance which 
accompanied certain striking images. More specifically, a genuine act of understanding 
may refer at bottom to the powers of certain words to bring back those insightful 
moments of primordial `seeings' that once upon a time were recognized as particularly 
significant. But if this is so, it  would hardly be surprising if thinkers like Black Elk did 
not even attempt to articulate the reasons for their claims to `see' the `truth.' Yet such 
thinkers can nonetheless perhaps be credited with intuitively anticipating Deleuze's 
summary conclusion, that truth is a matter of production, not adequation.  
When Black Elk paused to think about an account of events that belonged to the 
past, he perhaps also illustrated not only the truth of Deleuze's observation that `all is 
contemplation' but also the fact that the connective relationships that human beings 
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appear at times to establish between their mindings and the naturing of Nature attest to 
a kind of parallelism---that is, a kind of resonance between respective forms of ordering 
in Nature that (as Heraclitus might say) comes from being able to listen to the Logos. 
Deleuze in any case underscores the mystery invoked by the very idea of experience 
when he depicts this activity as dependent on an integration of all the contributions from 
all the faculties that happen to have been enlisted in trying to make sense. He indicates 
that the worth of each contribution depends on the quality of the education in previous 
periods of learning, which indicates that the problem of `good learning' is also relevant 
to the question of the quality of the sense that is being made.  
Hence if the making of good sense presupposes a successful learning of how to 
integrate the contributions of the work done by all the faculties involved, what could 
perform such a unifying function if not a properly educated faculty of imagination? 
Furthermore, in so far as the powers exercised by faculties are merely latent, they may 
never be properly educed, let alone correctly deployed. Since this applies to the powers 
of imagination, Nietzsche has good reason to suspect that the moderns propagate an 
endemic bad sense. Furthermore, since the kind of learning involved in developing the 
powers of the faculties takes time, as the learning of little children reminds us, Deleuze 
aptly describes learning in terms of the trope of  apprenticeship. It is far from incidental 
that he also holds that the most important learning takes place in the unconscious---
which happens to be commonly identified as the home of a spiritual agency called the 
soul.  
One ultimately arrives at the view, I am suggesting, aptly expressed by the poet 
Keats; that for all that the world appears to be a vale of tears, it would be more accurate 
to call it `a vale of soul-making.'  
What else could further this sort of work but an artful reason infused with a certain 
wisdom? That the primary aim of the natural philosopher ought to be this elusive goal 
is in fact the gist of the philosophical musings of the poet  S. T. Coleridge. Disgusted by 
the devivifying effects of modern reason he set out to frame a `true naturalism' informed 
by `realizing intuitions' that bespeak a special kind of `philosophic imagination.'16 This 
is a special power that  Deleuze appears also to be  alluding to in his major work in 
ontology, Difference and Repetition. He remarks in the preface that it is no longer possible 
to do philosophy in the `old style'---by which he presumably means in the manner of a 
conscious and conscientious methodical thinker whose faith in reason is invested solely 
in the truth-revealing powers of rigorous logical argumentation.  
                                                          
16. I discuss the relevance of Coleridge's views on the role of imagination in natural philosophy in Chapter 
6 of my PRPS. 
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As for what a `new style' might look like, once one has shaken oneself free of the 
modern naturalist's dream of finding final and complete answers to profoundly difficult 
philosophical questions,  the answer to the question of how to  conceive good reasoning 
may be implicit in Deleuze's observation that the history of philosophy is like a collage in 
painting. He herewith points the would-be naturalist towards a possible resolution of the 
ur-question of how best to do natural philosophy. What the would-be nonmodern 
naturalist needs most is a language based on what might be termed a unified word-collage 
comprised of what appears to be most valuable of the fragments of insights and intuitions 
that serious thinkers (and not just philosophers) have discovered.   
This last thought  lands us in front of another huge hurdle, however. In other words, 
the would-be nonmodern naturalist is here being urged to explore the possibility that 
the human animal is uniquely gifted in having evolved intuitive or imaginative powers 
or capacities to discern gems of wisdom that the ancestors have stored in their natural 
languages. These valuable remnants of so-called ` primitive' modes of thought are for the 
most part inherently invisible, so to speak, to all those thinkers who restrict themselves 
to the conceptual `world of representation.' The implication, in short, is that the 
indigenous cosmologist who is able to move more or less freely in the realm of the 
imaginal may be more rational than the modern cosmologist. While he/she can finds 
some support for this from Nietzsche, it is still very much a moot question however what 
kind of thinker might be a better rationalist.  
But assuming for the moment that the indigenous cosmologist has acquired a 
familiarity from the moment of birth with the efficacy of thinking in images, Black Elk 
may attest to the fact that indigenous peoples are able to `see' well just to the extent that 
in their early education they learned an essentially poetic capacity to think in images.17 
So it is also worth noting that indigenous peoples deliberately ` distance' themselves from 
mundane concerns when anticipating particularly significant moments of cognition---as 
in dreaming, performing rituals, taking part in ceremonies, and so on. Anticipating 
fruitful encounters with numinous images, they also manifest an understandable respect 
for the mystery that experiencing evokes when their contemplations appear to enlist 
natural powers that are capable of intuiting/imagining aspects of the numinous side of 
the worlding of the world.    
This convoluted situation suggests that the idea of evolution of consciousness needs 
special attention. It is a common belief among modern naturalists that consciousness has 
evolved from insentient material forms of organization. But if the evolution of 
                                                          
17. For an excellent discussion of four great Anglo-Saxon poets who illustrate this point, see Helen Vendler, 
Poet's Thinking: Pope, Whitman, Dickinson, Yeats (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2004) 
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consciousness alludes to sporadic growth in an ability to make a species-specific kind of 
sense in a drama involving many kinds of personalities, the related idea of emergence 
may refer to a relentless growth in the kinds of natural powers whose number and 
character need never be fixed once and for all.  
So it is also worth noting that there is no compelling reason to think that evolution 
can be accounted for in terms of eternal, universal, and immutable `laws of nature.' 
Deloria in fact suggests that the idea of evolution would be better referred to as 
`cosmogenesis,' which is preferable to `evolution' just because it does not presume that 
an adequate story about this evolutionary world can be grounded in a `uniformitarian' 
interpretation of emergence.18  
Indeed, adherents to neo-Darwinism frequently illustrate a systematic question-
begging since it is hardly self-evident that evolution refers to a continuous development 
of ever more complex forms of organic organization from a single primordial form of 
material organization. Certain anomalies in the fossil record, which tend to be 
overlooked, as Deloria points out, indicate that the evolution of new forms of 
organization may well evidence abrupt interruptions in a cosmic process that have then 
resulted in differently constituted patterns of biogenetic development.19  
There may even have been many occasions when Life on Earth was obliged to start 
its relentless growth over and over again under altered circumstances. But not 
necessarily from scratch, as it were. For if the cosmos is indeed alive, among all the 
natural powers invoked by the notion of a vital cosmogenesis there may be a power of 
unconscious memory which works in tandem with a creative power. That is a capacity 
to enlist previous forms of organization that may prove useful in new circumstances.  
The world may refer, in short, to a cosmic Will not only to perpetuate some forms 
of life but also to engender new forms of life for reasons that can only be guessed at.  
There is no denying that Nature has frequently developed ways of inserting bizarre 
forms of Life wherever it can get a foothold. This consideration allows for the possibility 
that Nature has simply been unwise on many occasions---as perhaps in creating the 
human organism. But be that as it may, the very existence of the amazing variety of 
                                                          
18. The term `cosmogenesis' Deloria borrows from Teilhard de Chardin. See MME, esp. Chapter VI.  
19. There is empirical evidence, in other words, for the claim that catastrophic global events have played 
an important part in cosmogenesis. That this cosmic movement also involves a creative factor can be 
inferred from the ` fact' that evolution has been halted and re-directed on account of, say, global catastrophes 
which have resulted in significant environmental upheavals. Apart from collisions with comets or large 
meteors, etc., a widespread decimation of organic life might also have resulted from dramatic alterations in 
global climate patterns, such as those envisaged by current predictors of anthropogenic climate change of 
the sort that is now threatening all life on earth. See MME, esp. Chapter XVI: “The Traumatic Planetary 
Past.”   
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perduring organic forms of organization which are not all beneficial to Life itself 
bespeaks a hidden creative power which is caught up in an ongoing and necessarily 
uncertain struggle between existing natural powers in the engendering of ever more 
complex forms of organic forms of organization. 
Thus in view of the mind-boggling complexity that I have only touched upon, it is 
hardly surprising that many proponents of neo-Darwinism stubbornly cling to the de-
vitalizing and de-spiritualizing metaphysics of mechanistic materialism. The irony is that 
many such thinkers clearly view themselves as civilized human beings who take pains to 
ensure their conduct is (or at least ought to be) morally and/or ethically upright. Thus 
whatever they might say in public they behave as though they were in possession of 
moral/ethical faculties which are just as worthy of being taken seriously as those sense 
faculties that deal with influential impingements on their  sense organs.  
So let us just accept for the moment that claims that we all dwell in a moral universe 
are  not unreasonable. Which is to say that when the topic of emergence is examined in 
the light of the notion of cosmogenesis it can generally be understood as alluding to the 
empirical fact that different species of organism enjoy different assemblages of natural 
powers that result in different ways of making sense. Perhaps it is a will to develop and 
exercise all the natural powers possessed by a sentient self that is behind what Nietzsche 
calls the `will to power'---a will that, following Deleuze, is exercised by each properly 
educed faculty to make the kind of sense it is capable of making. These `little' wills 
bespeak hidden desires, moreover, that conceivably drive the indigenous concern to find 
the proper moral and ethical road to walk on through life---a road that one can only 
hope will lead to the getting of that epitome of good sense called wisdom. 
7. ON HOW TO TELL A PLAUSIBLE STORY ABOUT COSMOGENESIS 
The above remarks are meant to elaborate on the question I am claiming the would-be 
nonmodern naturalist must face squarely:  whether it is possible to frame a vitalistic story 
about a living cosmos that is capable of showing that we do indeed live in a moral 
universe. For among the emergent faculties that the human organism enjoys there may 
well be moral/ethical faculties that are evidenced by the fact that a good deal of human 
experiencing is concerned with resolving moral/ethical dilemmas.    
Following the lead of Samuel Butler (1835-1902) I have already begun to explore this 
highly contentious matter.20 Initially an enthusiastic admirer of Darwin, Butler became 
                                                          
20. What follows is a condensed version of a more detailed discussion that I have pursued in Cosmos and 
History, published at <www. cosmosandhistory.org> volume 9, no. 1; volume 10, no. 2; and volume 12, no. 
1.  
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so repelled by the materialistic tenor of the Darwinian  approach that he set out to tell 
a Lamarckian story of evolution. Rejecting not only the claim that chance and natural 
selection can provide a sound basis for a systematic account of evolution, he denied that 
this approach even deserved the name of a scientific theory. He proposed instead to give 
a teleological account of evolution which presumes that the naturing of Nature is bound 
up with a cosmic aim to attain to a certain wisdom.  
Butler thus associates the idea of evolution with a vague  intention to develop ever 
more complex forms of organization that include ever more sophisticated forms of 
sensibility in order to...what, if not increase the depth and range of the understanding 
that complex forms of sensibility allude to? Which is a vague enough claim that can take 
into account the general idea that the worlding of the world is replete with a  variety of 
indissociable psycho-physical forms of organization called organisms whose lives are 
inevitably encompassed by uncertainties, given the hazards of contingent environmental 
conditions. But while his primary assumptions accord well with day-to-day human 
experiencing, he  tacitly acknowledges that attempts to account for the human ability to 
make sense cannot avoid some very tricky metaphysical problems. Among these is of 
course the problem of how the naturalist might go about  understanding the genesis of 
particular forms of organization in Nature itself---which leads to such questions as the 
nature and provenance of the forms of organization that the naturing of Nature spawns.  
Rejecting the view that there must be an external Creator/Director of the worlding 
of the world, Butler thus brings the would-be nonmodern naturalist face to face with the 
question whether or not cosmogenesis involves a natural power that is responsible for 
the creation of habits and instincts that warrant speaking about the order in Nature in 
the first place. Indeed, such a factor may also be needed to account for the powers of 
unconscious memory which help make sense of hereditary processes that preserve most 
habits while engendering some new and better ones. Thus the question arises whether 
there is also a creative power that wills changes in extant habits with the aim is to 
enhance the wisdom that Nature has given certain nonhuman creatures whose 
behaviour bear witness to a special kind of knowledge about how to survive in a 
complicated, largely unpredictable world replete with hazards and obstacles.   
Thus putting himself well beyond the pale of what the moderns deem rational and 
respectable in natural philosophy, Butler in effect allies himself with the thinking of 
indigenous cosmologists. His story of cosmogenesis, in other words, is consonant with 
those told by indigenous thinkers who appear to employ an artful form of reasoning that 
accords an important role in world-making to the notion of a soul. For although most 
moderns have no truck with the notion of soul-making, I am claiming that talk about 
souls is no more or less an offence against the ideal of rationality than the notion of an 
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organism in possession of a sentient body or an embodied mind. Indeed, all these elusive 
ideas are elicited at once by Butler who, following Lamarck, promotes the conception 
of an organism as an indissociable and sentient psycho-physical whole. 
It is therefore especially significant that Butler's attempt to tell a plausible story about 
evolution revolves about the obscure trope of a living self. His incomplete story is thus a 
failure only in the trivial sense that he is obliged to leave his readers with a multi-pronged 
challenge: to produce for themselves a vitalistic metaphysical imaginary that can bring 
under one roof, so to speak, a plethora of bold conjectures involving the relationships 
that link the tropes of habits, memories, and power in living human organisms.  
That is to say, in choosing to base his story-telling on an exploration of this complex 
of relationships he in effect enlists what might be called an anthropotropic metaphorics; 
that is, one that can be viewed as the basis of a `language of the self.' In other words, he 
can be read as providing an illustration of the sort of `single descriptive language' that, 
according to Deloria, indigenous cosmologists lack.  
The question is, then, is this sort of language capable of synthesizing the most 
general and important characteristics of concrete experiencing---which may pertain to 
both the material and immaterial aspects of their living and thinking? For Butler's tacitly 
proposed ` language of the self' evokes a picture of the world as a complex dance of inter-
acting hierarchies of sentient beings in communication with one another. That is, if one 
assumes that the idea of a world comprised of a single self is incoherent.  
So putting aside for the moment the ever-burning and very likely unresolvable 
question of what a ` true self' actually is, the question that looms over all others is whether 
or not Butler was on the right track in suggesting that evolution (or better cosmogenesis) 
betokens a vague aim in Nature to evolve a kind of wisdom. By choosing to hinge his 
story-telling on the trope of an ensouled psycho-physical whole, Butler thus opens up 
the possibility that human forms of organization attest to the presence of a more or less 
wise Spirit that indigenous thinkers have long since intuitively sensed. For one can view 
his story as fully compatible with a general principle of relativity of the sort that 
indigenous thinkers intuitively locate at the very heart of the universe. Furthermore, in 
trying to come to terms with the problem of how to live and think well, they indicate 
that only a figuratively constructed story about the worlding of the world could lead to 
an coherent understanding of a world suffused with immaterial powers.  
Put yet another way, Butler's story-telling may confirm the wisdom of indigenous 
seekers of wisdom who  eschew the idea that there can be a systematic explanation of 
everything under the sun. I have been suggesting that nothing actually stands in the way 
of the presumption that we dwell in a living cosmos that evinces a spiritual power or 
powers that warrant speaking of moral/ethical concerns. These powers appear to be 
 MURRAY CODE 97 
sensed by indigenous peoples whose moments of intense emotional awareness seem not 
unlike those that adventurous artists experience when they set out to create they know 
not exactly what. For the `something' an artist seeks may be inherently unknown until 
the work has progressed to that happy moment where its worth announces itself---by 
means of heightened visceral feelings of `rightness.  
Perhaps the true character of what Nature aims to produce in an ongoing 
cosmogenesis only gradually becomes definite during the course of the cosmic meaning-
making. One may suspect anyway that the image of Nature as a fallible cosmic artist, 
which Butler encourages but which apparently fills modern naturalists with a fear of 
vitalistic thinking, is an inevitable by-product of attempts to do justice to the idea of a 
living cosmos. Since there are bad artists as well as good artists, it is not inconceivable 
that Nature has not always been wise in its creative efforts, as for instance perhaps in the 
creation of human organisms.  
8. TOWARDS A COSMOGENY OF CONCERN 
So it is worth another digression to try to show that conjectures such as the above 
are not metaphysically baseless. It is especially relevant to both Butler's and Deloria's 
projects that A. N. Whitehead's major work in natural philosophy is based on the 
assumption that the natural philosopher cannot avoid engaging in  speculative 
metaphysics. More specifically, he too evokes a living cosmos when he puts forward a 
theory of actuality that involves an attempt to analyze concrete experiencing using an 
elaborate (some might say too elaborate) categoreal scheme that purports to expose  the 
most salient aspects of experiencing. It is thus highly significant that for all the formality 
of his elaborate categoreal scheme, his early mode of expression of its main features 
makes continual use of such homely terms as `desire,' ` satisfaction,' `appetite,' and so on. 
He thus suggests that in order to frame an intelligible  picture of  the worlding of the 
world, one ought to look at the most salient aspects of the experiencing of living, sentient 
organisms.  
In other words, Whitehead's attempts to do justice to the idea of experience can be 
described as an elaborate exploration of a `single descriptive language' of the sort that 
Deloria calls for. Urging in effect the need for a language of the self, Whitehead 
introduces his categoreal scheme, which is meant to precisify this thinking about 
actuality, with references to the `self-functioning' or `self-creative' characteristics of 
actual entities. His theory of actuality thus underscores the significance of a later 
observation that an actual entity is first and foremost a focus of felt concerns. Indeed, in 
one place he describes his philosophy of organism as a critique of pure feeling. So if 
his/her readers are inclined to believe that they are themselves actual entities, and since 
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there seem to be few human selves who believe they are not actual entities, Whitehead's 
approach to natural philosophy is consonant with the indigenous assumption that the 
most emotional side of experiencing is anything but irrelevant.   
The implicated image of a living cosmos which is a highly complex network of 
interacting, emotional personalities elicits a vast complex of soul-makers. Each of them 
has somehow assembled or been endowed with a complement of natural powers capable 
of `recognizing' more or less meaningful `objects of significance.' So if one grants that 
an individual actual entity can be imaged as a concerned self intent in its incessant 
becoming upon achieving a certain value-in-itself, the entire cosmos, when viewed as a 
process of processes of self-making, can be viewed in the same light. That is to say, the 
soul-making of this overarching cosmic Self would seem to be imbued with a vague 
purpose that can be linked to a Will to attain to a certain `quickness' in the most sentient 
forms of Life and Thought. Which implies that under the best circumstances 
cosmogenesis can indeed allude to the growth of a certain wisdom in Nature, although 
Whitehead's theory of actuality allows for a growth of bad sense too.  
Recalling the wisdom of Heraclitus, who hinted that in order for an experiencing 
self to understand its place in the world, it must first develop a wise-enough soul, 
Whitehead's allusions to the self in the context of elucidating the idea of an actual entity 
indicate that anyone bent on understanding his/her place in the worlding of the world 
ought first to look `inwards.' Herewith also opening up the current relevance of 
Heraclitus to the quest to understand the inherent mystery of experiencing, Whitehead 
no doubt ensured his relative invisibility in modern philosophy. But a more important 
reason for his lack of influence on the moderns probably concerns his unorthodox 
approach to the fundamental business of perception.  
The early Whitehead identifies this activity as the glue that holds the Heraclitean 
world of fluent events together. That is to say, he indicates that the coherence of the 
world depends upon a vast and intricate web of dynamic relationships between 
`percipient events' which bespeak a variey of modes of communication. That is, each 
such event is able to `recognize' aspects of the world that in one way or another mean 
something to it. These `objects of significance' may be material or immaterial since they 
presuppose `sense-awarenesses' that do not depend on the functioning of sense organs.  
The early Whitehead, in short, opens up the possibility that perception generally 
enlists both material and immaterial powers that have the capacity to ` recognize' specific 
`objects of significance' that in one way or another affect the well-being of the perceiving 
self. He thus begins to conjure up a living cosmos comprised of interacting selves infused 
with concerns that can take into account the concerns of other selves, which leads in 
turn to a complex picture of the worlding of the world as vast network of inter-linked 
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more or less localized assemblages of natural powers capable of making different kinds 
of sense.  
That acts of perception may also be capable in principle of recognizing spiritually 
infused objects of significance is an assumption that becomes even more explicit in 
Whitehead's later, more elaborate theory of perception. This involves a process of 
amalgamating two more primitive stages of perception: called `causal efficacy' and 
`presentational immediacy.' These two stages become fused into a unity in an act of 
perception where the conjoining is due to an essentially creative functioning that he calls 
`symbolic referencing.' Suggesting herewith that this indispensable mediating process 
can be likened to poetic creation, Whitehead thus imbues his general conception of 
perception with an imaginative power of symbolizing that suggests that the best place to 
learn an artful reason is in the realm of art.  
This being a possibility to which all the philosophers I have mentioned ultimately 
point, one can say that an artful reason  is marked by an especially efficient, unconscious 
power of  imagination. At the human level of sense-making, at any rate, there thus exists 
a certain freedom that time has shown brings with it certain responsibilities that give rise 
to all the moral/ethical dilemmas that so complicate human life and thought.  
Whitehead also confirms that there is no direct or simple way to justify this 
convoluted sort of story-telling since there is no ultimate ground in which to anchor 
meaning-making. Which is to say that one of the main lessons that Whitehead teaches 
the nonmodern naturalist is that the yearnings of modern naturalists for simple and final 
explanations of complex phenomena are essentially irrational, if not dangerously 
unbalanced.  
It is rather an enhanced wisdom they should be yearning for. Indeed, day-to-day 
experiencing continually reminds us that an overweening desire for simplicity merely 
distracts from the profound difficulty of making sense of a world that evidently cares 
only for the propagation of new selves from extant selves, not their survival. Whitehead 
underscores, in short, the primary importance of the question that Butler indirectly 
raises, whether the would-be naturalist can hope for nothing more certain that a 
plausible and reasonably adequate story about the naturing of Nature, one that is 
beyond the powers of systematic story-tellers to better, let alone criticize.   
Butler tacitly asserts moreover that the only viable `method' available to the 
nonmodern naturalist is not unlike which is very familiar to every indigenous person 
who grows up in a company of vivid story-tellers, as well as to every poet and/or literary 
critic who recognizes the cognitive powers of figurative language. Indeed, while this line 
of thought may be anathema to those who dream of final and complete explanations of 
natural phenomena, it is hardly unfamiliar to any ordinary person who has discovered 
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at a very early age that accredited conceptual tools are frequently inadequate even for 
the communication of very ordinary observations. So it is worth noting that when it 
comes to unusual insights or intuitions that have no clear and definite material basis, the 
meanings communicated are more often felt than discerned. The tendency to suppress 
the affective side of experiencing may thus be modern reason's most egregious error, one 
that has unfortunately served to  `normalize' the erection of conceptual smoke-screens 
whose major purpose appears to be to hide the mystery inherent in the very idea of 
experience.   
9. ON EDUCATION AND THE `BANALITY OF EVIL' 
All the thinkers I have mentioned point in one way or another to the wisdom of 
indigenous thinkers who hold that concrete experiencing must be the ultimate judge of 
whatever is valuable in the worlding of the world. This suggests that a world held 
together by a great variety of acts of `sense-awareness' is one whose coherence depends 
upon an interwoven, dynamic web of feelings of significance and/or importance. It is 
thus not a big step to the view that the strength or quality of the glue that holds the flux 
of events tegether depends on the personalities that happen to be directly involved. If 
this is so, world-making ultimately depends on the health of those elusive representatives 
of Spirit, or souls, whose characters can only be ascertained through contemplating 
`surface' behaviour; that is, the actual personalities exhibited in acts of experiencing. For 
a personality can be defined as the outward expression of an inner, spiritual `something' 
whose character can only be assessed by `outward' signs.  
Nothing therefore stands in the way of the indigenous thinker maintaining that life 
in general involves a constant meeting and mingling of personalities that bespeak more 
or less perplexed souls.  Furthermore, their entanglements involve imaginative sortings, 
siftings, judgings, and decidings. Butler partly illuminates this dynamic situation when 
he depicts the worlding of the world as a vast complex of interacting selves comprised of 
multifarious habits, unconscious memories, and peculiar assemblages of natural powers. 
To these three tropes Whitehead indicates that the trope of concern should be added in 
order to account for the symbolic nature of perceptual functioning. For that which holds 
the world together bespeaks more or less appropriate responses to many types of 
symbolism, not the least of which (in the case of the human organism) concerns the 
moral/ethical feelings of concern that indigenous peoples take for granted.  
It is no secret that the quality of responses to relevant concerns may well vary from 
person to person and culture to culture. Nor should it be surprising that incompleteness, 
vagueness, and uncertainty infuse all dealing with the concerns arising in the 
multifarious modes of experiencing the world. Hence the conclusion must be that the 
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only way that the would-be naturalist can determine whether the immaterial aspects of 
experiencing are `real' is through acquiring a certain skill in judging the `rightness' of 
certain feelings of significance.  
Which suggests, in short, that if the getting of wisdom is a prerequisite for making 
good sense, it is especially noteworthy that in the view of indigenous peoples, according 
to Deloria, a good education proceeds `from information to knowledge to wisdom.'21 
That is to say, it is not so much what one learns but how one learns that is crucial, which 
implies that the Western brand of education, which stresses the importance of acquiring 
technical knowledge is inadequate if not seriously detrimental to good thinking. Indeed, 
this sort of approach, says Deloria, `really says nothing and does nothing for the whole 
human being.22 Which is to say  that the moderns have developed systems of education 
that are  more likely to traduce the human desire to understand both the world and 
themselves than to advance the getting of wisdom.   
I have already noted that both Nietzsche and Deleuze indicate that the moderns 
have in fact instituted educational processes that teach a kind of stupidity---which is a 
kind that Nietzsche closely links to the obsession with acquiring ever more technical skills 
or reams of specialized knowledge. This kind of learning undermines those educators 
who instinctively believe it is their duty to try above all to educe all the latent powers 
that are given to each human infant at birth. It is thus highly significant that Deloria 
alludes to the wisdom of the `old ways' in which native peoples educated their young, 
ways that involved a constant telling and re-telling of stories. A good many of these 
stories appear to have been designed to sensitize young imaginations to the differences 
between the various personalities that the traveller will meet in his/her journey through 
life. They thus indicate that a story-telling approach to education is perhaps  far more 
conducive to the education of active imaginations than one that pretends that the 
complexities of existence can be mastered by forms of reasoning that privilege systems 
of deadening rules and/or precepts.23  
So it is also worth noting that the stories indigenous peoples tell each other are 
sprinkled with references not only to the conduct of noble but also that of ignoble souls, 
where the latter are often associated with the inconsequential Trickster whose antics 
                                                          
21. See esp. Part III of SR.  
22. SR, p. 142. 
23. See, e.g., W. S. Penn, ed., The Telling of the World: Native American Stories and Art (New York, Stewart, 
Tabori, and Chang) who associates story-telling with an aim to invest some words with sacred value whereby 
`the storytelling self loses his own "self" while the listening selves participate in the words of the story and 
create selves of their own, selves in relation to the selves listening, the selves telling, and all the selves who 
have come before..." (p. 10).  
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tend to spread trouble and confusion. But this is no hindrance to good learning since 
few lay persons would deny that many everyday moral/ethical dilemmas exemplify 
tensions that inevitably muddy the complex relationships that are continually forming 
and reforming between different personalities.  
It is, in short, not hard to believe that in order to do justice to the needs, desires, or 
interests manifested by different personalities there is no high road to the goal of wisdom. 
It is thus not incidental that Deloria's praise for indigenous methods of education 
suggests that the natural languages developed by indigenous peoples may be replete with 
the sort of wisdom that Whitehead believes is concealed in common words and which it 
is the busness of the metaphysician to try to imaginatively reveal. This is a kind of 
wisdom that is invisible to Western systematic reasoners who eschew speculative 
metaphysics and of course the illuminating powers of imagination.  
Instead of fostering understanding, the moderns tend to obfuscate it by privileging 
technically useful abstractions that further their overweening desire to acquire as much 
control (or secular power) as they can over Nature and all her creatures. One may thus 
suspect, in short, that a techno-scientific culture shot through with an overweening 
desire for control  bespeaks a very sick collective soul with fragmented natural powers. 
There is certainly no lack of evidence that such a culture is capable of doing untold harm 
not only to itself and other cultures but also to all life on earth, as Hannah Arendt has 
exhaustively shown.   
Being strongly motivated by a profound concern for the health of the collective 
mentality of the culture of the West, her study of the mentality of Adolf Eichmann in 
particular, which led her to coin the phrase  `banality of evil,' indicates that nothing is 
more important to the health of a culture than a mentality prepared to frequently stop 
and think about the meaning of good sense, and hence the worth of the ideas and 
practices that have become  `normalized' as the chief guides in day to day living and 
thinking.  
10. MUST THE WORLD DIE FOR OUR SINS? 
We thus return to the sticky question that I posed at the outset of this discussion---
whether anything can be done to rescue a self-destructive culture that behaves like a 
voracious parasite  unconsciously bent on destroying its only home in the name of 
progress.24 It is moreover a culture that appears to have blinded itself to the possibility 
                                                          
24. See Vine Deloria Jr., Custer Died For Your Sins (New York: MacMillan, 1969) in which he observes that 
`America has yet to keep one Indian treaty or agreement despite the fact that the United States government 
signed over four hundred such treaties and agreements with Indian tribes' (p. 28). 
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that its material ` successes' stem from a kind of culpable stupidity that warrants speaking 
of the `banality of evil.'  
In other words, a denial of the existence of moral and/or ethical faculties, not to 
mention aesthetic and religious ones, warrants speaking of a culture imbued with a 
cultivated tendency to sin against nature. As Deloria indicates in his survey of modern 
thought, it is a culture that has developed an incoherent collective mentality that is 
remarkably tolerant of violent solutions to moral/ethical problems. He in fact suspects 
that `non-tribal peoples' `have no sense of morality and integrity at all.'25 
Citing a few of the many examples he might have adduced to show not only the 
intrinsic shallowness of modern reason but also its pernicious influence on the 
`quicknesses' of Life and Thought, he notes that the invaders of north America not only 
forced upon indigenous peoples the assumption that it was in their interests to abandon 
their ancient tribal customs and adopt Anglo-Saxon ones. The colonizers also gave a 
license to self-righteous political and religious authorities to kidnap native children and 
force them to attend residential schools where they were forced to renounce their native 
languages on pain of severe punishment. Hence inasmuch as a natural language 
provides a living culture with the means to express its very soul, deliberate attempts to 
stamp out a native language can be viewed as an outstanding example of the evils that 
attend a `normalization' of cultural genocide. 
The current global situation, in short, evokes the kind of stupidity that Nietzsche 
alludes to which follows from a love of narrow perspectives. This tendency of the 
moderns not only helps perpetuate a soul-destroying kind of evil-doing. It is continually 
being made to pervade the entire culture by narrowly-focused and ambitious managers 
who are more concerned with furthering practical (e.g. economic) advantages than with 
developing humanistic ideals. The result is a collective mentality that can be viewed, in 
short, as destined to fulfill Nietzsche's virtual prophecy, that a mode of thought prone to 
think with a bad conscience is doomed to consign itself to a prison of its own making. 
The rise of a greedy and imperialistic corporatocracy, in particular, has amply shown 
that, as Deloria puts it, the culture of the West has always had the potential for `a 
totalitarianism transcending anything experienced by ancient peoples.'26  
Having embraced a conception of ` progress' that is subversive of some of its proudest 
ideals, there are therefore ample reasons for thinking it does not at present have the 
wherewithal to save itself. But there seems little doubt that once upon a time the culture 
of the West was on the point of instituting a humane form of reasoning. That the current 
                                                          
25. SR, p. 141. 
26. MME, p. 210. 
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situation however bespeaks a looming disaster is manifested by a degenerate collective 
imagination that is incapable of mustering a humble and respectful reverence for the 
wonderful fact of life itself, not to mention the inexhaustible mystery of thought.  
As many indigenous critics of the early colonists have pointed out, it was never the 
native `savages' who were in need of being `civilized.'27 Hence in regard to the question 
What If? that Deloria tacitly raises, when comparing the thinking of the moderns with 
that of indigenous peoples, it is not clear whether his optimism is warranted, for he 
remarks that   
the most fruitful avenues of development today are directing us toward a new type 
of social existence that parallels primitive peoples, perhaps incorporates some of 
their insights or unconsciously adopts some of their techniques, but which will be 
fully modern and capable of providing a meaningful existence.28 
However, as Latour indicates, such a future can only come to fruition if reform requires 
above all a viable means to bridge the gulf between nature and culture. It is evident that 
more and more educational institutions are embracing the soul-destroying language and 
short-term thinking of monster business corporations. Furthermore, legions of would-be 
`progressive' thinkers appear to be more concerned with improving the `intelligence' of 
dead machines than the emotion-laden natural imaginative intuitions of warm-blooded 
human beings.  
The point is that the radical changes required in order to begin a collective mentality 
to the point of thinking more wisely about how to live well would seem to depend upon 
a revolution in collective ways of soul-making. The outlook is thus far from promising,  
especially if Deloria is essentially correct and the predominant conception of a `good 
education' in the West is essentially inhumane.29 In other words, it is necessary to first 
displace the soul-destroying educational institutions that protect the current status quo. 
On the other hand, there is still the possibility that the not yet indoctrinated young, who 
are more likely to have a respect for the powers of imagination than their elders, may be 
able to find much of value in the tenacity of indigenous peoples who have insisted on 
preserving their cultures in the face of enormous odds. 
As for how to go about evolving a saner collective mentality, I have argued that 
                                                          
27. See, e.g., Ronald Wright, What is America? A Short History of the New World Order (Vintage Canada, 2009) 
who shows that many of the `uncivilized' North American natives had actually established very civilized 
ways of living and thinking. Displaying a more egregious savagery, the armed, aggressive, and greedy 
interlopers established a polity that entrenched a systemic hypocrisy that has resulted in such hubristic myths 
as that America represents the world's best hope.  
28. MME, p. 160. 
29. SR, p. 142.  
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Deloria is right about the need to first develop a  vitalistic metaphysical imagination that 
can serve as the principal instigator of a fundamental revolution in the manner in which 
we think and live. What Deloria himself hopes might transpire from a genuine revolution 
in the collective mentality can be inferred from his allusions to the work of Paul Radin.  
After studying many different aboriginal civilizations, Radin concludes that their 
`outstanding positive features' include `respect for the individual, irrespective of age or 
sex; the amazing degree of social and political integration achieved by them; and the 
existence ...of a concept of a personal security which transcends all governmental forms 
and all tribal interests and conflicts.'30  
Thus to bring into existence this kind of civilization is not impossible given that some 
indigenous peoples have managed once upon a time to achieve it, and so its potentialities 
may yet exist in the unconscious memory of the species. Deloria also indicates, however, 
that the emergence of healthy communities depends on their finding ways to unite 
cultural values with localized natural knowledge. Such a unification requires, however, 
developing at the same time a single descriptive narrative. This does not imply that a 
reformer needs to repeat the kind of inquiry that Deloria has undertaken. It would be 
quite unreasonable, as he himself says, to expect ordinary citizens to pursue the sort of  
detailed inquiry into the metaphysical implications of the various achievements and 
deficiencies of modern thought that he has so admirably undertaken.  
But this sort of inquiry is unnecessary, I have suggested, for once one has freed 
oneself from the constrictive shackles of modern reason, one is then free to contemplate 
the rich supply of potentially valuable metaphysical insights that are already available in 
the fragmented philosophy of the West.31 I have furthermore argued that the outlines of 
a unifying descriptive language have long since been available in the attempt of Samuel 
Butler to tell a vitalistic story about evolution, one that might be described as based on 
a metaphorics of the self. That is, he begins to outline a language centered on the tropes 
of habit, memory, and power to fashion a non-systematic means of synthesizing the most 
important insights and intuitions of all types of thinkers.  
Such a language must be able to do justice to the vitalizing myths that Nietzsche 
maintains every healthy culture in addition to  eliminating the bad ones.32 It is thus 
                                                          
30. MME, p. 160. 
31. In other words, we have perhaps arrived at the heart of the crisis in Western philosophy which has failed 
to synthesize the best insights and intuitions that philosophy has undoubtedly produced. Thus Arran Gare 
argues that what is urgently required at present is a concerted effort in natural philosophy to fashion a 
viable, unorthodox type of speculative naturalism. See The Philosophical Foundations of Ecological Civilization: A 
Manifesto for the Future (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017). 
32. This view is reinforced by Northrop Frye's view of the role that myths play in the enculturing of a 
collective mentality. Myths express the major concerns of a culture; that is, they refer to the hidden beliefs 
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possible that there may be many viable rivals when trying to frame an adequate vitalistic 
picture of cosmogenesis, for there is no reason to think that there is only one set of myths 
that can support a healthy, vital culture. By the same token, as Arendt's discovery of the 
`banality of evil' indicates, even an `advanced' modern culture that on the face of it has 
attained to a high degree of civilization can put itself in thrall to toxic myths. So history 
as well as present circumstances remind us that unless the collective mentality of the 
West can somehow learn to think more inclusively, and to embrace more life-enhancing 
myths, the  outlook for the future is indeed grim.   
 
 
 
                                                          
that underwrite the ideologies that predominate in the culture and which direct if not control the modes of 
thought that are regarded as `normal.' Thus there exist, in short, both good myths and bad myths. 
